船公司纵向整合对其横向合谋的传导机制研究

    Transmission Mechanism from Vertical Integration to Horizontal Collusion between Shipping Companies

    • 摘要: 在港航合作大背景下,针对寡头垄断行业中较为常见的合谋问题,创新构建一个具有离散时间段的无限次重复博弈模型,旨在探讨船公司的纵向整合和其横向合谋两者之间并存的可能性,并进一步分析它们的相互作用关系。研究结果表明,在航运服务替代性较小且市场竞争较为激烈的情况下,船公司的纵向整合能完全消除横向合谋给托运人带来的价格上涨不利影响。但是,从长期博弈视角,船公司的纵向整合将会提高其横向合谋的稳定性。

       

      Abstract: In the context of harbor-shipping company cooperation, collusion could be the issue which should be prevented.Discrete time period infinitely repeated game model is constructed to study the possibility of vertical integration-horizontal collusion coexisting and the interaction between them.The research shows that, in the situation of severe market competition and only few shipping services options available, the vertical integration of shipping companies will eliminate the influence of horizontal collusion on shipping price.However, from the perspective of long-term game, vertical integration of shipping companies will make horizontal collusion more stable.

       

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